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ABSTRACT 
Coopetition is a universal relationship in policy network where various organizations cooperate 
and also compete with one another. In addition, trust and distrust may coexist in any pair 
relations in policy network. As the coexistence of cooperation and competition, (and also that of 
trust and distrust), is somewhat inevitable in policy network, how can we make such ambivalent 
relationships more reliable and trustful? With the paucity of the multi-dimensional approaches to 
the trust and distrust in coopetition considered, this study explored the patterns and drivers 
behind the two paradoxes: trustful competitor and distrustful cooperator, by using the survey and 
interview with the nuclear-related public institutions in South Korea. The recent situation of the 
nuclear science and engineering in South Korea can be described as coopetition among nuclear-
related ministries and institutions in three domains such as denuclearization, nuclear waste 
disposal, and nuclear industry development. Under such multidimensional relations in nuclear 
policy network, the interviewed organizations were asked to give their own assessments about: 
(1) trust and distrust in their peer organizations in nuclear policy network, (2) stance on nuclear 
science and policies, (3) attribution of nuclear policy issues, (4) power of self- and peer 
organizations, and (5) contribution to nuclear policy issues. The findings of this study imply two 
major points. First, the degrees of assessment bias between nuclear-related organizations in 
South Korea may lead to trust in competition and also to distrust in cooperation. Second, as the 
view gaps beget trust in competition as well as distrust in cooperation, what matters in 
coopetition in policy network is not whether there is a view gap or bias between the network 
actors but when (or where) such gap exists so it can be beneficial or harmful to the coopetition. 
Based on the findings, the study suggests the theoretical implications and practical conditions of 
“trustworthy coopetition” in policy network, in terms of self- and environment assessments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Organizations come and go. But networks of organizations for policy making and 
implementation may last longer. Stakeholders in certain policy domain form networks to deal 
with uncertainty and pursue policy goals collectively in policy decision making process 
(Loorbach, 2010). An inter-organizational policy network is a persistent relationship of 
stakeholders in certain policy that has two characteristics: (1) each actor has and control its own 
resources, and (2) actors jointly participate and decide for collective decision making and 
delivery (Rethemeyer and Hatmaker, 2008; Saz-Carranza and Ospina, 2011). Considering the 
relational dynamics of policy networks based on autonomy and interdependence, this study 
focuses on the two types of co-existence of competing values: competition vs. cooperation; trust 
vs. distrust. 
First, competition and cooperation often co-exist in policy networks (Lee, Felock, and 
Lee, 2011). Many scholars have pointed out that such “coopetition” might be a universal 
relationship where various organizations cooperate and also compete with one another for their 
own and mutual interests. In short, organizations cooperate for market (or value) creation, and at 
the same time, also compete for market (or value) allocation and utilization (Brandenburger and 
Nalebuff, 1996; Dagnino, 2009; Kim, 2018; Lavie, 2008; Ritala, Valimaki, Blomqvist, and 
Henttonen, 2009). Second, besides the universality of coopetition in policy network, another set 
of values that co-exist is trust and distrust. Trust and distrust may also coexist in any pair 
relations in policy network because each of two concepts (trust and distrust) points to different 
dimension in dyadic relationship (Lee & Lee, 2018). 
As the coexistence of cooperation and competition, and also that of trust and distrust, is 
somewhat inevitable in policy network, how can we make such ambivalent relationships more 
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reliable and trustful? Competitor might be more likely distrusted than other stakeholders, and 
cooperator would be more trusted that others. However, beyond such common sense, this study 
focuses more on another set of paradoxical relationships: “trustful competitor” and “distrustful 
cooperator.” With the paucity of the multi-dimensional approaches to the trust and distrust in 
coopetition considered, this study explored the patterns and drivers behind the two paradoxes. In 
short, what factors drive the two paradoxical relationships? Among many possible drivers, do the 
disparities between network members’ perspectives influence their trust in competitor and 
distrust in cooperator? Are there any similarities and differences of the drivers? 
To answer these research questions, we used the data collected through survey and 
interview with the nuclear-related organizations in South Korea. The recent situation of the 
nuclear science and engineering in South Korea can be described as coopetition among nuclear-
related ministries and institutions in three domains such as denuclearization, nuclear waste 
disposal, and nuclear industry development. Thus, it is highly presumed that the organizations in 
the nuclear policy network in South Korea may have been experiencing the paradoxical 
relationships in coopetition, and thereby provide some clues to the drivers behind such 
relationships. The following section will present the theoretical background behind the research 
questions and models. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Response Variables: Trustful Competitor, Distrustful Cooperator 
This study explores the drivers behind the two response variables: trustful competitor, and 
distrustful cooperator. Many studies on policy networks have been conducted with regard to 
trust-based collaboration among network actors (Ansell and Gash, 2007; Emerson, Nabatchi, and 
Balogh, 2012; Hatmaker and Karl Rethemeyer, 2008; Lundin, 2007; Willem and Lucidarme, 
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2014). In many cases, distrust may be regarded as just an absence of trust, so they are mutually 
exclusive (Barber, 1983; Deutsch, 1958; Rotter, 1971, 1980; Stack, 1988; Tardy, 1988; Worchel, 
1979). 
However, the difference between trust and distrust has been getting more attention 
(Lewicki, 2006; Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies, 1998; McEvily, Radzevick, andWeber, 2012; 
Rousseau et al., 1998; Sitkin and Roth, 1993). To some scholars, absence of trust does not 
necessarily mean presence of distrust, and vice versa (Ullmann-Margalit, 2004). Similarly, “low 
distrust is not the same as high trust, and high distrust is not the same thing as low trust” 
(Lewicki et al., 1998: 444). In specific, trust is ‘belief in a person’s competence to perform a 
specific task under specific circumstances’, whereas distrust is ‘belief that a person’s values or 
motives will lead them to approach all in an unacceptable manner’ (Sitkin and Roth, 1993: 373). 
In sum, trust is more about hope, vulnerability, assure and initiating, while distrust is concerned 
with fear, and being skeptical and vigilant (Lewicky, 2006). 
Considering the different meanings of trust and distrust that exist in different dimensions 
or continua, distrust and trust are separate constructs, and therefore they may be not mutually 
exclusive (Cho, 2006; Lewicki, 2006; Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies, 1998; Lumineau, 2017; 
McEvily, Radzevick, and Weber, 2012; Sitkin and Roth, 1993; Wales, Parida, and Patel, 2013; 
Ullmann-Margalit, 2004). In other words, distrust and trust can coexist and further co-move in 
the same directions toward the same focal object (Otnes, Lowrey, and Shrum, 1997; Priester and 
Petty, 1996; Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin, 1995). 
Then, why do trust and distrust matter in coopetition? Trust matters even in competition 
because trust in competitor may signify the competition is fair, transparent and therefore 
sustainably beneficial to all competing actors. In detail, trust helps reducing uncertainty and risks 
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of decision, facilitating information exchanges (Granovetter, 1985; Muthusamy and White, 2005; 
Ostrom, 1998; Putnam, 2001), and reinforcing collaboration in networks (Ansell and Gash, 2008; 
Berardo, 2008; Calanni et al., 2014; Chen, 2010; Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh, 2012; 
Hatmaker and Rethemeyer, 2008; Imperial, 2005; Vangen and Huxham, 2003). On the other 
hand, cooperators may distrust each other because of selfish or opportunistic motivation or 
behaviors. Distrust in partner due to opportunism is something to be mitigated (Guo, Lumineau, 
and Lewicki, 2017) because such distrust may make cooperation vulnerable and counter-
sustainable. In sum, trust and distrust influence the coopetition relationship simultaneously 
(Dagnino, 2009). 
Control Variables: Relationship between Pair—Competition, Cooperation 
In studying factors behind trust (or distrust), the causality between dis-/trust and the arguable 
drivers may be not always clear, so reverse causality is not totally excluded (Klijn, Edelenbos, 
and Steijn, 2010). Exploring the drivers behind trustful competition and distrustful cooperation, 
we can trust competitors just because we are also cooperating with them. And we can distrust 
cooperators just because we also compete with them (Gamson, 1968; Triandis et al., 1975). 
Therefore, our research questions should be specified like this: When do we trust our 
competitors regardless of whether we cooperate with them? When do we distrust our cooperators 
regardless of whether we compete with them? In this sense, this study controls for the degrees of 
cooperation in pursuit of explanatory variables of trustful competitor. And we also control for the 
degrees of competition in exploration of drivers of distrustful cooperator. 
Explanatory Variables: View Gap between Pair 
Among various dimensions and types of possible explanatory variables, this study focuses more 
on how each organization in policy network views internal and external environment, and how 
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such views differ in dyadic relationship may influence trust and distrust in each other. Such view 
of internal/external environment is a kind of frame or framing which has various types such as 
substantive, outcome, aspiration, process, identity, characterization, and loss–gain frames (Gray 
1997). 
The impacts of views or frames on trust or distrust have been studied by many scholars. 
For instance, trust is built in various contexts such as economic/calculus-based and 
social/knowledge-based ones (Castaldo and Dagnino, 2009). And distrust can be driven by 
category (Kramer, 1999), stereotype or prejudice (Devine 1989; Dovidio et al. 2008; Lewicki, 
Barry, and Saunders, 2007; Lumineau, 2017; Kramer, 2004; Russell and Russell, 2010), 
characterization framing (Gray, 1997), and also by whether to be out-group or not (Brewer and 
Kramer, 1985; Brewer, 1979, 1999). Besides the impacts of frame on trust and distrust, even the 
gap of frames or views in dyadic relationship may also matter. It has been studies that distrust 
can be driven by view gap or frame mismatch (Kaufman, Elliott, and Shmueli, 2003; Kaufman 
and Smith, 1999; Lewicki, Barry, and Saunders, 2007). 
With this in mind, this study explored the diversity of view gaps in dyadic relationship as 
explanatory variables in the four sequential criteria of the value chain of decision making: (1) 
stance on policy issues; (2) attribution of policy issues; (3) power assessment (for action plans); 
(4) contribution to policy issues, as follows. 
Explanatory Variables 1: View Gap between Pair in the Stance on Policy Issues 
The first set of explanatory variables is the view gap between pair in terms of stance on policy 
issues. Interest or goal incongruence between or among actors is one of the drivers of coopetition 
(Dagnino, 2009). Further, having the same identity or having a compatible mission enhances 
trustworthiness (Williams, 2001; Schindler-Rainman, 1981). On the contrary, incongruence 
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between network actors in terms of values, interests, or goals may engender distrust (Hardin, 
2004; Larson, 2004; Lewicki, 2006; Sitkin and Roth, 1993; Ullmann-Margalit, 2004). In this 
study, the stance in-/congruence is assessed in three domains: (1) nuclear risk management; (2) 
gains from nuclear development; (3) national strategy of nuclear development. 
RQ1. How would the dyadic gap of the stance on nuclear policy issues (i.e., dyadic gap 
of assessments on nuclear risk management, gains from nuclear development, and 
national strategy of nuclear development) influence the response variables—trustful 
competitor and distrustful cooperator? 
Explanatory Variables 2: View Gap between Pair in the Attribution of Policy Issues 
Since Heider (1958) began to systematically build attribution theory, the problem of attribution 
has been widely studied in explanation of individual and social phenomena (Crandall, Silvia, 
N’Gbala, Tsang, and Dawson, 2007; Kwan and Chiu, 2014). According to the theory, a problem 
can be attributed to internal factors (e.g., effort, ability) or external ones (e.g., situation, social 
pressure), but such attribution can be biased. In this regard, attribution fallacy (Kramer, 1994) or 
bounded rationality (Lewicki et al., 1998) has been pointed to as drivers of dis-/trust. Also 
considering the three components of trustworthiness—ability, benevolent, and integrity (Mayer, 
David, and Schoorman, 1995), what a network actor attributes policy issues to may represent the 
actor’s reasoning ability and trait. Therefore the view gap of attribution of policy issues is 
presumed to influence trust or distrust in dyadic relationship. In this study, five objects of 
attribution are examined: (1) policy communications; (2) rationality of policy decisions; (3) 
politics in ministries which oversee the public organizations studied in this research; (4) political 
influence on focal organization; (5) ministry influence on focal organization. 
RQ2. How would the dyadic gap of the attribution of nuclear policy issues (i.e., dyadic 
gap of assessments on policy communication, rationality of policy decisions, politics in 
ministries, political influence on focal organization, and ministry influence on focal 
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organization) influence the response variables—trustful competitor and distrustful 
cooperator? 
Explanatory Variables 3: View Gap between Pair in the Power Assessment 
Reciprocity is one of the keys to trust in networks (Hatmaker and Rethemeyer, 2008; Park and 
Rethemeyer, 2014). In this regard, power symmetry between organizations enhance 
interdependence and reciprocal relationships (Baur et al., 2010). On the other hand, in a 
transactional relationship between network actors, an actor with more power has less incentive to 
reciprocate the counterpart (Hardin, 2004; Kramer, 1998). So power asymmetry may lead to 
lessened trust (Hurley, 2006; Kramer, 1999) or even distrust (Hardin, 2004; Kramer and Wei, 
1999; Kang and Park, 2017). In short, status heterogeneity discourages collaboration, but 
similarity of status enhances trust (Soekijad and van Wendel de Joode, 2009). In this study, the 
impacts of two kinds of power assessment gap are explored: (1) dyadic gap of self-assessments 
by focal and partner organization; (2) gap between focal organization’s self-assessment and 
partner organization’s assessment of focal organization. 
RQ3. How would the dyadic gap of the power assessment between pair (i.e., dyadic 
gap of self-assessments by focal and partner organization, and gap of focal 
organization’s self-assessment and partner organization’s assessment of focal 
organization) influence the response variables—trustful competitor and distrustful 
cooperator? 
Explanatory Variables 4: View Gap between Pair in the Contribution to Policy Issues 
Degrees of participation in collective tasks influences propensity to trust (Lee et al., 2016; Shah, 
1998; Stolle, 1998; Veenstra, 2002). On the contrary, exploitive behavior is one of the drivers of 
distrust (Triandis et al., 1975). In this study, the dyadic gap of assessments are examined for two 
domains: (1) participation in policy process, (2) cooperation with other peer organizations in the 
network. 
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RQ4. How would the dyadic gap of the contribution to nuclear policy issues (i.e., 
dyadic gap of assessments on participation in policy process, and cooperation with 
other peer organizations in the network) influence the response variables—trustful 
competitor and distrustful cooperator? 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
METHODS AND DATA 
Case 
The answers to the research questions were sought by examining the nuclear policy network in 
South Korea. (More content to be added on the governance and dynamics surrounding the three 
main issues: denuclearization, nuclear waste disposal, and nuclear industry development.) 
Data Collection and Analysis 
Sampling was conducted through four steps. First, we made a sampling frame consisting of three 
categories of nuclear-related organizations: (1) public institutions established and funded by 
government; (2) central and local government agencies; (3) academic or non-governmental 
organizations. Second, using in-depth interviews with experts in nuclear policies, the first 
category (i.e., public institutions established and funded by government) was chosen as research 
subjects because the institutions in that category are more intimately interacting with one another 
than others in other two. Third, based on the interviews with experts again, we prioritized and 
chose the top 17 institutions according to their influences in nuclear-related policy process (see 
Table 1). Fourth, we contacted and surveyed the mid-career staff in each institution, who are in 
charge of public relations or planning so they can best represent their own institutions’ interest 
and stance. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
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Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
The staff we contacted were asked a series of questions—structured and open-ended. 
They provided their assessments about: (1) trust and distrust in their peer organizations (i.e., 17 
institutions) in nuclear policy network, (2) stance on nuclear science and policies, (3) attribution 
of nuclear policy issues, (4) power of self- and peer organizations, and (5) contribution to nuclear 
policy issues. As the data mainly consists of dyadic relationships and peer evaluations among the 
17 institutions, the original sample size is 272 (i.e., 17 × 17 – 17). After removing a missing data 
point, we eventually got 271 as sample size. Using the data collected, we ran two models to 
examine the explanatory variables’ impacts on the two response variables (i.e., trustful 
competitor; distrustful cooperator). For data analysis, we used ordinary least squares regression 
(OLS) and also considered fixed effects to control the possible unique patterns of each 
organization’s responses. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
FINDINGS 
How do the assessment bias or gap between policy network organizations influence their trust or 
distrust in the context of coopetition?  The analysis results shown in Table 4 provide answers to 
the research question. To being with, the statistics for the control variables can be explained as 
predicted: (1) the more cooperation, the more likely trustful competitor; (2) the more 
competition, the more likelihood of being distrustful cooperator. As the two kinds of 
relationship—cooperation and competition—usually co-exist in dyadic association, such result 
might be in line with common sense. However, as we focus more on the paradoxical 
phenomena—trustful competitor and distrustful cooperator, we employed two methods: (1) the 
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degrees of competition and cooperation were controlled for; (2) to use the dyadic relations in 
fairly high competition and cooperation, we used the data whose values are over a cutoff at 
[mean – standard deviation] for competition and cooperation respectively. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
 Table 4 shows the statistics as the clues to the four research questions. For the first 
question, “How would the dyadic gap of the stance on nuclear policy issues (i.e., dyadic gap of 
assessments on nuclear risk management, gains from nuclear development, and national strategy 
of nuclear development) influence the response variables—trustful competitor and distrustful 
cooperator?”, there are three sub-items. When it comes to the “view gap of nuclear risk 
management”, it turned out that a focal organization, even if it is a competitor, is more trusted 
when it has a more negative view on nuclear risk management so the view gap is more negative. 
Similarly, a focal organization, even if it is a cooperator, is more distrusted when it has a more 
positive view on nuclear risk management so the view gap has a positive value. In short, a focal 
organization is considered as more trustful and less distrustful when it has a more prudent and 
conservative view on nuclear risk management. But for another sub-item of “view gap of nuclear 
national strategy”, the statistics shows a somewhat opposite pattern. A focal organization is more 
trusted when it has a more positive view on nuclear development so the view gap has a positive 
value. In sum, the public institutions in the nuclear policy network have an ambivalence: (1) they 
trust the more prudent and cautious partners even in competitive relationship, and distrust the 
less cautious partners even in cooperative relationship; (2) they trust the more enterprising 
partners for the promotion of nuclear energy and industry. 
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As for the second research question, “How would the dyadic gap of the attribution of 
nuclear policy issues (i.e., dyadic gap of assessments on policy communication, rationality of 
policy decisions, politics in ministries, political influence on focal organization, and ministry 
influence on focal organization) influence the response variables—trustful competitor and 
distrustful cooperator?”, the statistical results shows the unique patterns of the explanatory 
variables. When it comes to the explanatory variables of trustful competitor, a focal organization 
in competition is more trusted when: (1) it has a more positive view on the policy 
communications in terms of diversity, ease to join, transparency and fairness of communication 
channels in policy process. (i.e., “Yes, the policy communication channels are diverse, easy to 
join, transparent and fair.); (2) it has a more critical view on politics in government ministries 
which oversee the public institutions, (i.e., “Yes, the government ministries are much influenced 
by political interests.”); (3) it has a more negative view on political influence on the focal 
organization. (i.e., “No, my organization is not seriously influenced by national politics.”). 
For another response variable of distrustful cooperator, the explanatory variables usually 
show the opposite patterns. A focal organization in cooperation is more distrusted when: (1) it 
has a more negative view on the rationality of policy decisions in terms of scientific and 
economic considerations. (i.e., “No, the nuclear policies are made irrationally.”); (2) it has a less 
critical view on politics in government ministries which oversee the public institutions, (i.e., 
“No, the government ministries are unlikely influenced by political interests.”); (3) it has a more 
positive view on political influence on the focal organization. (i.e., “Yes, my organization is 
seriously influenced by national politics.”); (4) it has a more positive view on ministry influence. 
(i.e., “Yes, my organization is seriously influenced by ministries that oversee us.”) 
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For the thirds research question, “How would the dyadic gap of the power assessment 
between pair (i.e., dyadic gap of self-assessments by focal and partner organization, and gap of 
focal organization’s self-assessment and partner organization’s assessment of focal organization) 
influence the response variables—trustful competitor and distrustful cooperator?”, the analysis 
results show two major findings. First, when the view gap of power between focal and partner 
organization is more positive (i.e., a focal organization is considered more powerful than a 
partner one), the focal organization is more trusted even in competition, and it is also more 
distrusted even in cooperation. In other words, trust and distrust co-exist in power imbalance. 
Second, when the gap between focal organization’s self-assessment of power and partner 
organization’s assessment of focal organization’s power is more negative (i.e., a focal 
organization considers itself as less influential than a partner considers the focal organization is.), 
the focal organization is more distrusted even in cooperation. 
As for the last research question, “How would the dyadic gap of the contribution to 
nuclear policy issues (i.e., dyadic gap of assessments on participation in policy process, and 
cooperation with other peer organizations in the network) influence the response variables—
trustful competitor and distrustful cooperator?”, the analysis results provide two answers to it. 
First, when the view gap of participation in policy process is more negative (i.e., a focal 
organization considers itself to have participated in policy process less actively than a partner 
one), the focal organization is more trusted by the partner one in competition. On the contrary, 
the focal organization is more distrusted even in cooperation when it considers itself to be more 
actively participating in policy process than a partner organization. Second, when the view gap 
of cooperation with other organizations in network is more negative (i.e., a focal organization 
has an underestimation of its contribution to the policy network than a partner one), the policy 
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network actors have an ambivalent attitude because the focal organization is more trusted in 
competition, and interestingly also more distrusted in cooperation. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Coopetition might be prevalent in policy networks where multiple organizations cooperate and 
compete with one another. So it would be natural to think of the presence of two paradoxical 
relationships: trustful competitor and distrustful cooperator. In this regard, how does the view 
gap or bias between policy network actors influence the two paradoxes? The findings of this 
study imply two major points. First, the degrees of assessment bias between nuclear-related 
organizations in South Korea may lead to trust in competition and also to distrust in cooperation. 
Second, as the view gaps beget trust in competition as well as distrust in cooperation, what 
matters in coopetition in policy network is not whether there is a view gap or bias between the 
network actors but when (or where) such gap exists so it can be beneficial or harmful to the 
coopetition. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
In detail, as summarized in Table 5, it turned out that there are similarities and 
differences in the drivers of trust and distrust in coopetition. And such findings of this study 
imply several points for “trustworthy coopetition” in policy network in terms of self- and 
environment assessments. To begin with, there are several characteristics of a focal organization 
that is more trusted by its competitor. The “trustful competitors” are: (1) balancing analysis and 
action because they are more cautious of technological risks, but more active in furtherance of 
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nuclear industry, (3) introspective because they are less likely attributing policy problems to 
external environments (i.e., policy communication channels, rationality of policy decisions in 
policy network, and political influence on focal organizations), and (4) having a realistic and 
humble assessment of their contributions to policy problems, than their partner organizations in 
competition. And the “distrustful cooperators” tend to have the opposite characteristics. 
Besides such divergent drivers of trust and distrust, there are also common factors. In 
specific, the likelihood of becoming trustful competitor and distrustful cooperator has risen 
together in two cases: (1) when there is a significant power imbalance between organizations, 
and (2) when cooperative effort for partner organizations is perceived as deficient within inner 
network. In such cases (i.e., power imbalance, and deficient cooperation in close relationships), 
ambivalence of trust and distrust became more noticeable. 
Beyond the findings and implications of this study, there are other research topics to be 
addressed in the future. For instance, such topics as the impacts on mutual biases between policy 
network actors on coopetition and the influence of selfish or altruistic motivation on coopetition 
need to be researched further through follow-up studies. 
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Figure 1. Research Questions at a Glance 
 
 
 
Table 1. Organizations Surveyed in this Study 
Function of organization (in the field of nuclear science and industry) Number of organization 
Research 5 
Electricity provision 4 
Industry association 2 
Safety and environment 2 
Other (electricity exchange; international relations; material provision; 
public information) 
4 
Total number of organizations 17 
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Table 2. Variables and Measures 
Variables in the models Basic variables utilized in formula*** α†††
Response variables*   
 Dis-/trust between pair (focal and partner organization)  
  trustful competitor In competitive relationship (i.e., over a critical 
point of [mean – standard deviation]), partner 
organization’s trust in focal organization for the 
three nuclear policy issues.** 
0.94 
 distrustful cooperator In cooperative relationship (i.e., over a critical 
point of [mean – standard deviation]), partner 
organization’s distrust in focal organization for 
the three nuclear policy issues.** 
0.95 
Control variables   
 Relationship between pair  
 cooperation b/w pair Degrees of cooperation with partner organization 
in the three nuclear policy issues.** 
0.86 
 competition b/w pair Degrees of competition with partner organization 
in the nuclear policy issues.** 
0.87 
Explanatory variables†   
 RQ1. View gap between pair (1): Stance on nuclear policy issues  
 view gap of nuclear risk management Technological safety; constant innovation; quality 
management; quality training; environmental 
safety 
0.86 
 view gap of nuclear gain Economic cost efficiency; social cost efficiency; 
industrial value; national security value 
0.85 
 view gap of nuclear national strategy Future need for nuclear energy; increasing 
proportion of nuclear energy 
0.73 
 RQ2. View gap between pair (2): Attribution of nuclear policy issues  
 view gap of policy communications Diversity; ease to join; transparency; fairness 0.81 
 view gap of rationality of policy decisions Technological rationality; economic rationality; 
industrial rationality; energy-mix rationality 
0.88 
 view gap of politics in ministries Political influence on ministries; seeking 
ministries’ own interests 
0.75 
 view gap of political influence on focal org. Political influence on focal organization n/a 
 view gap of ministry influence on focal org. Ministry influence on focal organization n/a 
 RQ3. View gap between pair (3): Power assessment between pair  
  view gap of power b/w focal & partner org. Degrees of influence of focal organization in 
nuclear policy 
n/a 
 view gap of power b/w focal & focal by partner org.†† Degrees of influence of focal organization in 
nuclear policy (perceived by focal organization) – 
degrees of influence of focal organization in 
nuclear policy (perceived by partner organization)
n/a 
 RQ4. View gap between pair (4): Contribution to nuclear policy issues  
 view gap of participation in policy process Focal organization’s diverse participation; active 
participation; influential participation in policy 
process and communication 
0.92 
 view gap of cooperation with network org. Focal organization’s active cooperation with other 
nuclear-related organizations for 
denuclearization; for nuclear industrial 
development 
0.77 
Note: *To use the dyadic relations of fairly high competition and cooperation, the data whose values are over [mean – standard 
deviation] were used. **Three nuclear policy issues: denuclearization; nuclear waste disposal; overseas nuclear business. *** All 
the basic variables were measured using five-point Likert scale. 1 = very unlikely (negative); 5 = very likely (positive). † Most of 
the explanatory variables are calculated using this formula: [aggregation of focal organization’s responses to the basic variables – 
aggregation of partner organization’s responses to the basic variables]. The basic variables are specified in the next right cells. 
††The only exceptional formula of explanatory variable is for the variable “view gap of power b/w me & partner to me”. †††α 
signifies the Cronbach’s alpha as the reliability of the variables that aggregated the multiple basic variables. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Variables 
Variables Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1 trustful competitor 289 9.02 3.51 3 15 1.00  
2 distrustful cooperator 289 5.31 2.45 3 13 0.14 1.00  
3 cooperation b/w pair 271 6.12 3.28 3 15 0.59 0.12 1.00  
4 competition b/w pair 271 4.13 1.86 3 12 0.13 0.50 0.31 1.00  
5 view gap of nuclear risk 
management 
272 0.00 4.33 -10 10 -0.07 0.23 0.04 0.05 1.00 
6 view gap of nuclear gain 272 0.00 6.05 -12 12 -0.07 0.24 0.07 0.17 0.86 1.00
7 view gap of nuclear national 
strategy 
272 0.00 1.77 -5 5 -0.02 0.26 0.12 0.26 0.80 0.87 1.00
8 view gap of policy 
communications 
272 0.00 4.00 -9 9 0.13 0.23 -0.06 -0.09 -0.08 -0.11 -0.37 1.00
9 view gap of rationality of 
policy decisions 
272 0.00 6.10 -17 17 0.11 0.13 -0.13 -0.18 -0.11 -0.16 -0.33 0.77 1.00
10 view gap of politics in 
ministries 
272 0.00 1.74 -5 5 -0.15 -0.27 0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.10 0.08 -0.39 -0.40 1.00
11 view gap of political 
influence on focal org. 
272 0.00 1.46 -3 3 -0.23 -0.19 0.02 -0.13 0.12 0.23 0.19 -0.23 -0.02 0.55 1.00
12 view gap of ministry 
influence on focal org. 
272 0.00 0.88 -2 2 -0.07 0.18 -0.01 -0.12 0.27 0.42 0.17 0.17 0.25 0.14 0.28 1.00
13 view gap of power b/w focal 
& partner org. 
289 0.00 1.75 -4 4 0.01 -0.32 -0.10 -0.23 -0.50 -0.48 -0.57 -0.15 0.11 0.19 -0.03 0.01 1.00
14 view gap of power b/w focal 
& focal by partner org. 
289 -0.17 1.63 -4 4 -0.20 -0.31 -0.40 -0.28 -0.36 -0.34 -0.44 -0.11 0.00 0.16 -0.05 -0.02 0.70 1.00
15 view gap of participation in 
policy process 
272 0.00 3.56 -9 9 0.07 0.26 -0.06 -0.01 -0.09 -0.07 -0.28 0.78 0.59 -0.20 -0.41 0.12 0.07 0.06 1.00
16 view gap of cooperation with 
network org. 
272 0.00 2.07 -6 6 -0.09 0.15 -0.07 -0.08 0.20 0.34 -0.03 0.50 0.38 0.04 -0.04 0.48 0.24 0.20 0.73 1.00
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Table 4. Models on the Drivers of Trustful Competitor and Distrustful Cooperator 
Explanatory and control variables Response variables 
Trustful 
competitor 
Distrustful 
cooperator 
Relationship between 
pair 
cooperation between pair 0.59*** 
competition between pair 
 
0.69*** 
View gap 
between 
pair 
RQ1. 
Stance on 
nuclear 
policy issues 
view gap of nuclear risk management -0.33*** 0.27*** 
view gap of nuclear gain -0.14 0.16 
view gap of nuclear national strategy 2.63*** -0.10 
RQ2. 
Attribution 
of nuclear 
policy issues 
view gap of policy communications 1.53*** 0.11 
view gap of rationality of policy decisions -0.03 -0.40*** 
view gap of politics in ministries 0.65*** -1.53*** 
view gap of political influence on focal org. -1.63*** 1.45*** 
view gap of ministry influence on focal org. 0.49 2.30*** 
RQ3. 
Power 
assessment 
between pair 
view gap of power b/w focal & partner org. 1.67*** 0.96*** 
view gap of power b/w focal & focal by partner org. -0.10 -0.22** 
RQ4. 
Contribution 
to nuclear 
policy issues 
view gap of participation in policy process -0.61* 1.52*** 
view gap of cooperation with network org. -0.99* -1.97*** 
Observations 271 271 
Adjusted R-squared 0.66 0.70 
Note: Ordinary Linear Regression model with fixed effect considered. Individual subject’ dummies are not presented. 
Unstandardized coefficients are reported. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Highlighted coefficients represent significantly positive 
correlations between response and explanatory variable. Coefficients with bold and italic font represent significantly negative 
correlations between them. 
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Table 5. Impacts of Assessment Biases on Trustworthy Coopetition 
Explanatory variables (view gap between 
pair) 
Response variables 
Trustful competitor Distrustful cooperator 
Stance on 
nuclear 
policy issues 
view gap of nuclear risk 
management 
More negative view on  nuclear 
risk management (i.e., more 
prudent and conservative) 
More positive view on nuclear 
risk management 
view gap of nuclear gain n/a n/a 
view gap of nuclear 
national strategy 
More positive view on nuclear 
development 
n/a 
Attribution 
of nuclear 
policy issues 
view gap of policy 
communications 
More positive view on policy 
communications (i.e., less 
external attribution of policy 
issues) 
n/a 
view gap of rationality of 
policy decisions 
n/a More negative view on 
rationality of  policy decision 
(i.e., more external attribution of 
policy issues) 
view gap of politics in 
ministries 
More critical view on politics in 
ministries 
Less critical view on politics in 
ministries 
view gap of political 
influence on focal org. 
More negative view on political 
influence (i.e., less external 
attribution of policy issues) 
More positive view on political 
influence (i.e., more external 
attribution of policy issues) 
view gap of ministry 
influence on focal org. 
n/a More positive view on ministry 
influence (i.e., more external 
attribution of policy issues) 
Power 
assessment 
between pair 
view gap of power b/w 
focal & partner org. 
More influential than partner organization (i.e., trust and 
distrust coexist in power imbalance) 
view gap of power b/w 
focal & focal by partner 
org. 
n/a Self-assessment as less 
influential than what partner 
organization views the focal 
organization as (i.e., evasion of 
responsibility) 
Contribution 
to nuclear 
policy issues 
view gap of participation 
in policy process 
More negative self-assessment of 
participation in policy process 
(i.e., underestimation of focal 
organization’s contribution to 
policy issues) 
More positive self-assessment of 
participation in policy process 
(i.e., overestimation of focal 
organization’s contribution to 
policy issues) 
view gap of cooperation 
with network 
organizations 
More negative self-assessment of cooperation with network 
organizations (i.e., humble estimation of focal organization’s 
contribution to policy issues might be respected by partner 
organization; but actually lack of cooperative efforts is also 
criticized in dyadic and more direct relationships.) 
Note: Highlighted cells represent unique drivers of either of response variables. Bold font represents ambivalent drivers of both 
response variables. 
 
 
 
